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WHAT KIND OF JUDGE IS BRETT KAVANAUGH? 
A Quantitative Analysis 
Elliott Ash† & Daniel L. Chen† 
 This article reports the results of a series of data analyses of how recent 
Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh compares to other potential Supreme 
Court nominees and current Supreme Court Justices in his judging style. The 
analyses reveal a number of ways in which Judge Kavanaugh differs 
systematically from his colleagues. First, Kavanaugh dissents and is dissented 
against along partisan lines. More than other Judges and Justices, Kavanaugh 
dissents at a higher rate during the lead-up to elections, suggesting that he feels 
personally invested in national politics. Far more often than his colleagues, he 
justifies his decisions with conservative doctrines, including politicized precedents 
that tend to be favored by Republican-appointed judges, the original Articles of the 
Constitution, and the language of economics and free markets. These findings 
demonstrate the usefulness of quantitative analysis in the evaluation of judicial 
nominees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 When institutions are tested and politics are divided, Americans 
look to the courts as the final safeguard against instability and the 
erosion of rights. This is especially true of the Supreme Court and sets 
the stakes for any new addition to the bench. With a conservative 
majority in the balance, the nomination to replace Justice Kennedy 
gives President Donald J. Trump the opportunity to define American 
law for the next generation. 
 As social scientists who use data to understand the U.S. legal 
system, we have analyzed the records of the short list of potential 
nominees. Though we can’t read their minds, new data technologies 
allow us to sift through a judge’s record to uncover new insights into his 
or her worldview and political values. 
 First, though judges are nominally expected to sit above the 
partisan fray, we find evidence that Judge Kavanaugh is highly divisive 
in his decisions and rhetoric. He tends to dissent and be dissented 
against, typically along partisan lines. 
 Indeed, Judge Kavanaugh is in the top percentiles of dissents, 
especially against Democrat-appointed colleagues. This divisiveness 
ramps up during election season: Kavanaugh in particular is observed 
disagreeing with his colleagues more often in the lead-up to elections, 
suggesting that he feels personally invested in national politics. 
 Next, we examined the writing style of Judge Kavanaugh and 
compared it to the writing style of recent Supreme Court Justices. We 
found that Judge Kavanaugh’s writing style is closest to that of Justice 
Samuel Alito, one of the Court’s more conservative Justices. 
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 We then looked at some of the political and ideological features of 
Kavanaugh’s opinions that may be driving his motivation to dissent, and 
his similarity to Justice Alito. Far more often than his colleagues, Judge 
Kavanaugh justifies his decisions with conservative doctrines, including 
politicized precedents that tend to be favored by Republican-appointed 
judges, the original Articles of the Constitution, and the language of 
economics and free markets. 
 Finally, an exploratory sentiment analysis of his opinions shows 
that Judge Kavanaugh tends to speak negatively of liberalism. He also 
expresses dislike toward government institutions and toward working-
class groups. 
 These results will be useful to senators and the public as they 
consider the nomination of Judge Kavanaugh for the Supreme Court. 
More generally, this essay shows that a quantitative approach can be 
useful in evaluating judge decision-making. This approach could be 
used in the future, not only for the Supreme Court, but for other 
judgeships. 
 The rest of this Essay is organized as follows. Section I describes 
the previous literature. Section II describes the data and empirical 
approach. The next sections report the results on divisiveness (Section 
III), text similarity to Supreme Court Justices (Section IV), political and 
ideological content (Section V), and sentiment associations (Section 
VI). These are followed by a Conclusion. 
I.     PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 Presidential nominations of Supreme Court Justices have generated 
significant scholarly interest. Some recent literature focuses on 
attempting to predict the ideological leanings of President Trump’s pick 
to replace Justice Kennedy;1 another set of work investigates the policy 
preferences and writing style of Trump’s most recent appointee, Justice 
Neil Gorsuch.2 
 Judicial ideology itself is the subject of a large body of literature, 
much of which has focused on Supreme Court Justices.3 C. Hermann 
Pritchett’s work on the Roosevelt Court is an early example of a 
quantitative approach to estimating the ideologies of individual Justices 
 
 1 See, e.g., Jeremy Kidd, How Conservative Will President Trump’s Next Supreme Court 
Nominee Be?: A Short Empirical Investigation (July 6, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209602. 
 2 See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Estimating the Policy Preferences of Judge 
Neil M. Gorsuch (Feb. 10, 2017), https:// ssrn.com/abstract=2915233; Nina Varsava, Elements of 
Judicial Style: A Quantitative Guide to Neil Gorsuch’s Opinion Writing, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
ONLINE (forthcoming 2018), https:// ssrn.com/abstract=3166538. 
 3 See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideology 
and the Study of Judicial Behavior, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, & LAW 705 (2012). 
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using voting data.4 A more recent, influential example is the Martin-
Quinn score, which places ideology in the context of a broader judicial 
decision model that allows for judicial policy preferences along multiple 
dimensions, variance in the salience of these dimensions across 
individual cases, and temporal shifts in policy preferences.5 Other 
established approaches to estimating judicial ideology that are not 
reliant on vote data (and therefore are applicable prior to confirmation) 
include analyzing the text of editorials describing the nominees6 and 
using the political ideologies of the Presidents who nominate them, or 
the senators from the candidates’ home states, as proxies.7 
 Much of the above literature grappling with judicial ideology 
utilizes techniques that are not readily applicable to both Supreme Court 
Justices and judges on lower courts; political scientists and legal 
scholars seeking to apply uniform analysis to a broader set of courts 
have developed other approaches better calibrated to indicia of ideology 
and policy preference that are available throughout federal and state 
judiciaries. In The Judicial Common Space, the authors unify the 
approach of leveraging the ideologies of appointing presidents and 
candidates’ home state senators8 with Martin-Quinn scores for Supreme 
Court justices to provide a common analytical policy space for all Court 
of Appeals judges and Supreme Court Justices appointed since 1953.9 
Others take a different, agency-motivated approach, using clerk 
ideology to estimate the ideology of judges throughout the federal 
judiciary.10 These authors create these “Clerk-Based Ideology” (CBI) 
scores by matching samples of individuals who clerked between 1995 
and 2004 with population-level data on political donations and 
validating judges’ CBIs through a comparison to Giles et al.’s 
NOMINATE scores.11 
 
 4 C. HERMANN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND 
VALUES, 1937–1947 (1948). 
 5 Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision 
Making: Again Revisiting The Judicial Mind (May 2, 2001), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download;jsessionid=EE358C86092701340D6D30D3F7D129DA?doi=10.1.1.24.1490&
rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 6 See LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005); Segal et al., Ideological Values and Votes of the U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological 
Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). 
 7 See Michael Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection 
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007). 
Updated data through April 26, 2018 is available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
JCS115.01.zip. 
 10 See Adam Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
96 (2017) [hereinafter “Political Ideologies”]; Adam Bonica et al., Measuring Judicial Ideology 
Using Law Clerk Hiring, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 129 (2017) [hereinafter “Law Clerk Hiring’]. 
 11 Bonica et al., Political Ideologies, supra note 10; Bonica et al., Law Clerk Hiring, supra 
note 10; Giles et al. supra note 7. 
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 Recent work by Charles M. Cameron, Jonathan P. Kastellec, and 
Lauren A. Mattioli uses a “characteristics approach” to presidential 
selection of Supreme Court nominees that formalizes presidential 
demand functions for a variety of nominee attributes.12 Rather than 
envisioning a presidential selection process singularly focused on 
candidate ideology and its effect on the ideological composition of the 
Court, the characteristics approach theorizes that presidents nominate 
candidates based on demand for a bundle of their desirable attributes, 
including ideology, experience, background, race, and gender.13 
Demand for each attribute is a function of the attribute’s political 
returns to the president and the costs associated with placing an 
individual with that attribute on the Court. In addition to explicating a 
theory of selection that helps to explain why presidents do not always 
optimize their potential ideological impact on the Supreme Court,14 
Cameron, Kastellec, and Mattioli apply their characteristics approach to 
54 nominees and 299 shortlisters chosen by 15 presidents between 1930 
and 2018.15 They find that the ratio of benefits to costs of candidate 
attributes is predictive of the level of ideology and policy reliability of 
nominees;16 moreover, both presidential interest in selection and the 
availability of candidates with desirable attributes has increased over 
time, leading in part to increasingly diverse pools of candidates.17 
 One thread in judicial ideology literature that is of particular 
relevance to an analysis of Judge Kavanaugh is the information 
provided by dissent behavior. Although academic observers have long 
found dissent behavior salient,18 a substantial body of recent literature 
places dissents and dissent aversion in the context of broader judicial 
behavior and leverages dissent-related insights to estimate judicial 
ideology.19 One feature of this body of literature is the attempt to 
explain why judges undertake dissents despite potential collegiality and 
effort costs incurred in dissenting. Because dissents generally result in 
more work for the majority, who as a rule revise their opinions in 
 
 12 See Charles M. Cameron et al., Presidential Selection of Supreme Court Nominees: The 
Characteristics Approach (July 18, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216757. For a treatment of 
presidential selection of federal lower court judges, see SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL 
JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997). 
 13 Cameron, supra note 12. 
 14 Charles M. Cameron & Jonathan P. Kastellac, Are Supreme Court Nominations a Move-
the-Median Game?, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 778 (2016) (arguing that “move-the-median” models 
of Supreme Court nominations do a poor job predicting ideology of Supreme Court nominees). 
 15 Cameron, supra note 12, at 2. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 2–3. 
 18 C. Hermann Pritchett was motivated in part to investigate Supreme Court ideologies by the 
sharp rise in published dissents beginning in the 1930s. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 67 (2013). 
 19 See id. for a survey of dissent-related literature and RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES 
THINK 31–34 (2008), for an informal model of dissent aversion. 
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response to dissents,20 and can generate majority resentment at being 
critiqued, dissenting may impose collegiality costs on judges and 
Justices, making them less well-liked and potentially disadvantaged in 
attempting to get their colleagues to join them in future decisions.21 This 
effect is likely to be amplified by larger caseloads, which suggests that 
collegiality costs may be higher for Courts of Appeals judges than for 
Supreme Court Justices.22 The fact that judges dissent despite these 
costs suggests that the value that they place on the potential influence of 
a dissent—with its attendant reputational enhancement—and the 
promotion of their own views, outweighs collegiality and effort costs.23 
It is not clear that the small influence enjoyed by dissents on average (as 
measured primarily by the very low rates of dissent citation in both the 
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals),24 however, provides much of an 
incentive to dissent apart from “self-expressive utility.”25 
 How judges express themselves, in terms of vocabulary and other 
markers of writing style, has also generated a significant body of 
literature. While some contributions to this scholarship have been 
qualitative,26 much recent work has been quantitative.27 Nina Varsava, 
for instance, uses computational linguistics methods to find that Neil 
Gorsuch’s writing differs from that of his former Tenth Circuit 
colleagues, including in its level of informality, suspenseful structure, 
and use of qualifiers.28 Other quantitative work explores responsiveness 
of word choice to panel effects and reversal aversion.29 
 
 20 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 286 (finding that, on average, Courts of Appeals 
majority opinions are 41% longer when there is a dissent, while the comparable figure for the 
Supreme Court is 23%). 
 21 See, e.g., Collins J. Seitz, Collegiality and the Court of Appeals, 75 JUDICATURE 26, 27 
(1991). 
 22 See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 61 (2006); see also 
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 256–72. 
 23 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 257 (“A judge who derives great utility from 
expressing his views may, especially if he finds himself on a court in which those views are 
shared by few of the other judges, derive a benefit from frequent dissenting that exceeds the cost 
he incurs in effort and in impairment of collegiality.”). 
 24 Id. at 288–92. 
 25 Id. at 291. 
 26 For a treatment of judicial opinion writing style in general and an analysis of whether it 
affects the content of opinions, see Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They 
Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421 (1995). 
 27 See, e.g., Adam Chilton, Kevin Jiang & Eric Posner, Rappers v. Scotus, SLATE (June 12, 
2014 7:49 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/06/
supreme_court_and_rappers_who_uses_a_bigger_vocabulary_jay_z_or_scalia.html. Text files 
containing the analysis underlying Rappers v. Scotus are available at The Vocabularies of 
Supreme Court Justices, ADAM CHILTON DATAVERSE (June 3, 2014), https://
dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/26411&studyListingIndex=
1_7ccc980f1b5c4e18d5164b2a3980. 
 28 See Varsava, supra note 2, at 1–2, 5–11, 22–40. 
 29 See Rachael K. Hinkle, Andrew D. Martin, Jonathan David Shaub & Emerson H. Tiller, A 
Positive Theory and Empirical Analysis of Strategic Word Choice in District Court Opinions, 4 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 407 (2012) (finding “a statistically significant increase in the use of certain 
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 The instant piece adds to recent research using tools from machine 
learning and artificial intelligence to analyze judicial decision-making. 
Much of traditional scholarship on how legal decisions are made has 
been based on theoretical work, anecdotal evidence, and the analysis of 
academics,30 but the field increasingly benefits from robust case-level 
datasets.31 The availability of this data has made it possible to use 
machine learning tools to evaluate judicial decision making and assess 
whether it can be improved by assistance from algorithms. 
 One insight of this recent analytical literature is the extent to which 
legal outcomes can vary even when judges are presented with similar 
facts. In one example, a study documents a wide range in the probability 
of applicants being granted asylum from judge to judge when certain 
facts are held constant.32 Another example shows that changes in 
judges’ working conditions can impact effort and decision quality (as 
measured by citations), which both vary widely from judge to judge.33 
Other recent studies show direct evidence of judges at least occasionally 
responding to extraneous factors like hunger, weather, and sporting 
event outcomes.34 
 In prediction applications, machine learning algorithms are most 
useful when prediction criteria are well defined and when large amounts 
of data are available to “train” the algorithms. Although their use in the 
legal system is currently limited, algorithms have been successfully 
employed to predict failure to appear in bail settings,35 re-arrest of 
violent offenders,36 and local violence for police targeting.37 Ex-post 
 
types of language as the ideological distance between a district court judge and the overseeing 
circuit courts judges increases”). 
 30 See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR (2007). 
 31 David Arnold et al., Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. Econ. __ (forthcoming 2018); 
Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and 
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201 (2018); Sonja 
B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of 
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L. J. 2 (2013); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. 
Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320 (2014). 
 32 Linda Camp Keith et al., Explaining the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates Among 
Immigration Judges: An Attitudinal and Cognitive Approach, 35 L. & POLICY 261 (2013). 
 33 Elliott Ash & W. Bentley MacLeod, Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and 
Evidence from State Supreme Courts, 58 J.L. & ECON. 863 (2015). 
 34 Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 6889 (2011); Daniel L. Chen, Mood and the Malleability of Moral Reasoning, https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2740485 (last updated June 30, 2017). 
 35 Jiaming Zeng et al., Interpretable Classification Models for Prediction, 180 J. ROYAL 
STAT. SOC’Y: SERIES A (STAT. SOC’Y) 689 (2016); Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and 
Machine Predictions, 133 Q. J. ECON. 237 (2018). 
 36 Jianghong Liu, Early Health Risk Factors for Violence: Conceptualization, Evidence, and 
Implications, 16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 63 (2011); Richard A. Berk et al., Forecasting 
Domestic Violence: A Machine Learning Approach to Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 94 (2016). 
 37 Robert A. Blair et al., Predicting Local Violence: Evidence from a Panel Survey in Liberia, 
54 J. PEACE RES. 298 (2017). 
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algorithmic assessment of court decisions is rarer, but at least one parole 
board uses such a process.38 Notably, one study has been able to predict 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions using only information available before 
the decision—at 70% accuracy.39 
 A handful of legal scholars have recently employed a particular 
machine-learning approach—topic modeling—to analyze large amounts 
of text from court cases. In particular, there is work that quantitatively 
assesses the stylistic output of the Supreme Court. One 2016 piece 
analyzes the entire historical body of the Court’s opinions, finding that 
contemporaneous Justices write more similarly to each other than to 
Justices of different time periods, but that stylistic heterogeneity has 
grown with the increasing involvement of clerks in opinion writing.40 
Another piece takes a similar approach to showing that the Court’s style 
is growing more distinct from those of lower courts over time.41 
II.     DATA AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 The data for this analysis are constructed from the full corpus of 
U.S. Circuit Court cases, obtained from Bloomberg Law. The analysis 
includes all published Circuit Court decisions for the years 1975 (the 
earliest year of appointment for the included judges) through 2013. For 
each decision, we have authoring judge and his/her co-panelists, the 
filing date, some metadata such as area of law, and the full text of each 
opinion (majority, concurring, and dissenting). 
 For the results, we focus on the set of judges who served on a 
federal Circuit Court and were later nominated for or promoted to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. The results are reported as figures, with the judges 
abbreviated as BKav (Brett Kavanaugh), NGor (Neil Gorsuch), MGar 
(Merrick Garland), Bork (Robert Bork), Alito (Samuel Alito), AKen 
(Anthony Kennedy), Soto (Sonia Sotomayor), JRob (John Roberts), 
RBG (Ruth Bader Ginsburg), SBre (Stephen Breyer), CTho (Clarence 
Thomas), and Scalia (Antonin Scalia). Except in Section V (comparison 
of writing style), the data consists of their Circuit Court, not Supreme 
Court, decisions. 
 The statistical regression estimates are generated using standard 
fixed-effects regression methods. We control for court and time specific 
 
 38 Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk Forecasts on Parole Board 
Decisions and Recidivism, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 193 (2017). 
 39 Daniel Martin Katz et al., A General Approach for Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 12 PLOS ONE (Apr. 12, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0174698. 
 40 See Keith Carlson et al., A Quantitative Analysis of Writing Style on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461 (2016). 
 41 See Michael A. Livermore et al., The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 837 (2017). 
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factors, either in terms of levels or in variability. We cluster the 
standard errors by judge. Regression tables for all figures are available 
on request from the authors. 
 Most of the results are reported as coefficient plots, constructed as 
statistical differences from other judges. The marks give the average 
difference of the judge from the comparison group judges, while the 
error spikes are 95% confidence intervals summarizing the precision of 
the estimate. The horizontal dashed line is zero, so estimates where the 
confidence interval is far away from the dashed line indicate a 
statistically significant difference. A marker above the gray dashed line 
indicates a positive effect, while a marker below the gray dashed line 
indicates a negative effect. 
 While the regression methods are standard, what is new in the 
methodology is the adoption of recent text-based metrics of judge 
writing style. These include language similarity to other judges, 
extraction of partisan language or citations, use of economic analysis in 
opinions, and measuring expressed sentiment toward types of topics or 
social groups. Description of these methods, and citations to the 
relevant sources, are included along with the associated results. 
 The metrics that we have analyzed here are likely to be predictive 
of how Kavanaugh would make decisions on the Court. In unpublished 
work, we have used our historical data to show that these circuit-court 
metrics are predictive of subsequent decisions on the Supreme Court. 
To do this, we used the published decisions of all 26 appellate judges 
who sat on at least fifty circuit cases and later served on the Supreme 
Court from 1946 to 2016. As the outcome, we used the average 
conservativeness of a Supreme Court Justice’s decisions, as coded by 
the Supreme Court Database.42 We then looked at the bivariate 
correlations separately for each metric. 
 We found that a judge who moves from using the most Democratic 
language to the most Republican language is associated with a 23 
percent increase in conservative votes. Moving from the most 
Democratic precedent citations to the most Republican precedent 
citations is associated with a 32 percentage point increase in 
conservativeness. A judge who moves from the lowest to highest rank 
in similarity to Judge Posner is 18 percentage points more likely to vote 
conservative; for economics language usage, that difference is 6 
percentage points. Moving from the lowest to highest rank in vote 
polarization means a 25 percentage point increase in conservative vote 
rate, and 8 percentage points for electoral dissent rate. These differences 
are statistically significant. 
 
 42 See The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. L., http://scdb.wustl.edu (last visited Sept. 4, 
2018). 
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III.     EVIDENCE OF DIVISIVENESS 
 We start by looking at disagreement. In Circuit Courts, cases are 
usually decided by panels of three judges, and sometimes there are 
dissents. We would like to know how Judge Kavanaugh compares, in 
terms of dissents, to his Circuit Court colleagues and to Supreme Court 
Justices. 
A.     Writing and Provoking Dissents 
Figure 1A: Judge Differences in Dissent Rates 
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Figure 1B: Judge Percentiles in Dissent Rates 
 
 In Figure 1A, we ask whether Kavanaugh dissents more often than 
his colleagues. In this figure, as in most of those below, we show a 
coefficient plot to indicate statistical differences between the named 
judge and other judges on the same Circuit.43 We see that Judge 
Kavanaugh dissents much more often than his colleagues. 
 This story is strengthened in Figure 1B, which reports the 
percentiles for each of the judges on dissent rates. This is the rank of the 
indicated judge compared to the whole population of circuit court 
judges in this time period. Kavanaugh is ranked in the top 4th percentile 
for overall dissent rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 Coefficient plots from vote-level regressions, where the outcome is whether the vote is a 
dissent. The coefficient is on a dummy variable for whether the vote is by the Circuit Court judge 
indicated, and the regression includes case fixed effects. The error spikes indicate 95% 
confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered by judge. 
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Figure 2A: Differences in Tendency to Provoke a Dissent 
 
Figure 2B: Percentiles in Generating Dissents 
 
 In Figures 2A and 2B, we ask a related question: When a judge 
authors an opinion, is it likely to provoke a dissent? We see again that in 
the case of Judge Kavanaugh, the answer is yes. When Kavanaugh 
authors an opinion, it is highly likely that a dissent will be filed against 
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him, compared to his colleagues. As seen in Figure 2B, Kavanaugh is in 
the top 13th percentile for generating dissents. In contrast, Gorsuch and 
(especially) Garland generated fewer dissents than average. 
B.     Partisan Dissents 
 Next we look at how these dissent tendencies vary with the 
partisan affiliation of judges. While federal judges do not have an 
official party label, we can make strong inferences about their partisan 
ties based on the party of the President who initially appointed them. So 
in our case, Reagan, Bush (I or II), and Trump nominees are considered 
Republicans: Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, Bork, Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, 
Thomas, and Scalia. Clinton/Obama nominees are considered 
Democrats: Garland, Sotomayor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Breyer. We 
ask whether a judge is more likely to dissent when paired with political 
opponents. 
 For this analysis, the regression is the same as in the previous 
section, except that the treatment variable is interacted with a dummy 
variable equaling one for when the other two members on the panel are 
from the opposing political party.44 So a positive coefficient means the 
judge dissents more often when co-panelists are from the political 
opposition. The idea is that judges who tend to dissent only against 
judges appointed by the opposing party’s president are engaging in 
“Partisan Dissents” or “Vote Polarization.”45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 The regressions include case fixed effects and judge fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by judge. 
 45 See Elliott Ash, Daniel Chen & Wei Lu., Motivated Reasoning in the Field: Polarization in 
Precedent, Prose, Vote, and Retirement in U.S. Circuit Courts, 1800–2013, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3205116 (last updated July 25, 2018). 
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Figure 3A: Partisan Dissents – All Cases 
 
Figure 3B: Partisan Dissents – Due Process 
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Figure 3C: Minority Dissent Rate Percentile 
 
 Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C report this analysis. First, in Figure 3A, we 
see that Kavanaugh is relatively polarized in his dissents. This means he 
tends to dissent more often when sitting with two Democratic-appointed 
co-panelists. Figure 3B shows that Kavanaugh, like Alito, tends to 
dissent against Democrats in Due Process cases. Figure 3C indicates 
that Kavanaugh is a true outlier on this metric, ranking in the top 1st 
percentile of judges based on partisan dissents. 
C.    Election-Season Dissents 
 Another way that dissents can provide evidence of political 
motives is whether they respond to external political factors. A previous 
paper shows that circuit court judges tend to dissent more in the run-up 
to presidential elections, consistent with a (perhaps subconscious) 
political cheerleading motive.46 In this section, we ask how Kavanaugh 
and other Supreme Court nominees respond on this margin: Do they 
tend to dissent more in the months leading up to a presidential election? 
 
 46 See Carlos Berdejó & Daniel L. Chen, Electoral Cycles Among U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Judges, https:// ssrn.com/abstract=2928201 (last updated May 14, 2017). 
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 This analysis again builds on the basic dissent analysis from above, 
with the addition that the treatment variable is interacted with a dummy 
variable equaling one for February through October of a presidential 
election year.47 A positive coefficient means that a judge dissents more 
than usual (that is, compared to his/her normal baseline) during election 
seasons. 
Figure 4A: Electoral Cycle – All Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 The regression includes circuit-year fixed effects and judge fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by judge. 
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Figure 4B: Electoral Cycle – Due Process 
 
Figure 4C: Electoral Dissent Rate Percentile 
 
 We see in Figure 4A that, indeed, Kavanaugh does get fired-up 
during election seasons. In the months leading up to presidential 
elections, Kavanaugh is more likely to dissent relative to his baseline 
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level of dissents (which, we have highlighted above, is already higher 
than that of his colleagues). Figure 4B shows that the electoral dissent 
effect happens especially for Due Process cases. And again, as 
illustrated in Figure 4C, Kavanaugh is a true outlier on this metric, 
ranking in the top 1st percentile. Sonia Sotomayor, the second-highest 
Supreme Court nominee on this metric, is in the 30th percentile. 
 Electoral dissent is potentially a problematic behavioral tendency. 
It is indicative of susceptibility to extraneous factors, raising the 
question of what other behavioral factors—beyond political—might 
affect a judge’s decisions. Do behavioral factors become relevant in 
settings where judges are closer to indifference? 
IV.     COMPARISON OF WRITING STYLE TO SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES 
 Next we will start looking into the linguistic content of Judge 
Kavanaugh’s opinions. As he is a nominee for the Supreme Court, we 
would like to ask what type of Justice he might be. To do this, we 
construct a geometric representation of his writing style, as expressed in 
the language of his authored opinions. We then look at the distance (or 
closeness) of this writing style to the geometric representations of the 
case portfolios for each recent Supreme Court Justice. 
 We use a text analysis technique, which we described in a recent 
paper,48 that allows us to measure the similarity of language across 
judges. The technique works as follows. Document vectors for each 
case are constructed using the Doc2Vec implementation in Python 
Gensim.49 The vectors are de-meaned by court, topic, and year, to try to 
isolate ideological content, and then averaged by judge. Judges are 
compared by the cosine similarity (geometric closeness) of the vectors. 
 Figure 5 shows the similarity of Kavanaugh’s writing to a set of 
recent Supreme Court Justices. The figure provides coefficient plots 
from judge-level regressions, where the outcome is similarity to the 
named Supreme Court Justice, and the coefficient is on a dummy 
variable for Kavanaugh. A mark further to the right means a higher 
similarity of case language to the indicated Supreme Court Justice. A 
mark to the left means lower language similarity. 
 
 
 
 
 48 See Elliott Ash & Daniel L. Chen, Mapping the Geometry of Law Using Document 
Embeddings (July 2, 2018), http://users.nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Mapping_the_Geometry_of_
Law_using_Document_Embeddings.pdf. 
 49 See Doc2vec Paragraph Embeddings, GENSIM, https:// radimrehurek.com/gensim/models/
doc2vec.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). We used 200-dimensional vectors. 
88 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  DE•NOVO  [2018 
Figure 5: Comparison of Kavanaugh’s Writing Style to that of 
Supreme Court Justices 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 5, Kavanaugh is most similar to Justice 
Samuel Alito, a Bush appointee with a reputation as a conservative. 
Interestingly, while Kavanaugh was a former Kennedy clerk, he is not 
relatively similar to Kennedy in how he writes his opinions.50 These 
rankings give some insight into what kind of Justice Kavanaugh would 
be if confirmed. 
V.     POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL FEATURES OF OPINIONS 
 In this section we dig deeper into the political and ideological 
content of Judge Kavanaugh’s opinions. These results will provide 
some evidence on the set of decision motives that are driving Judge 
Kavanaugh’s tendency to dissent, and his similarity to Alito. 
A.     Language and Precedent Partisanship 
 What are the doctrinal sources of ideological polarization in the 
judiciary? One idea is that the language used, or the authorities cited, 
might be informative about political views. To investigate this issue, we 
 
 50 In a previous version of this paper, we found that Raymond Kethledge (another former 
clerk) was quite similar to Kennedy on this metric. 
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use the partisan association of text and citations to measure the degree 
of polarization among these judges. 
 First, we would like to measure the use of partisan language in 
each case. To do so, we use a dictionary of partisan phrases, as 
described in the working paper by Ash, Chen, and Lu,51 which provides 
a ranking of those phrases associated more with Democrat-appointed 
judges and those phrases associated more with Republican-appointed 
judges. A case with more of these phrases could then be considered to 
be relatively politicized, and similarly with a judge who uses more of 
these phrases. The method is based on a recent paper that analyzes 
polarization in congressional speeches.52 
Figure 6A: Language Partisanship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 Ash, Chen & Lu, supra note 47. 
 52 Matthew Gentzkow et al., Measuring Group Differences in High-Dimensional Choices: 
Method and Application to Congressional Speech, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., http://
www.nber.org/papers/w22423.pdf (last updated Aug. 2018). 
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Figure 6B: Language Partisanship Percentile 
 
 Figures 6A and 6B show how the Supreme Court nominees stack 
up in terms of the partisanship in their language.53 In these coefficient 
plots, a positive coefficient means the judge prefers language distinctive 
of a Republican, while a negative coefficient indicating preference for 
Democrat-distinctive language. We can see in Figure 6A that 
Kavanaugh is more polarized than average, but it is not quite 
statistically significant. In the percentile rankings (Figure 6B), he is beat 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. 
 Another way that a case could exhibit partisanship is in its 
selection of previous cases that are cited as references. Anecdotally, it is 
well recognized that some precedents are preferred by Republicans and 
others are preferred by Democrats. The working paper by Ash, Chen, 
and Lu54 provides a data-driven ranking of precedents along this 
margin, where, based on the citations in an opinion, one could 
potentially predict the political party of the authoring judge. In our 
regressions using precedent partisanship as an outcome, a positive 
coefficient means that the judge uses Republican-distinctive precedents, 
while a negative coefficient indicates the use of Democrat-distinctive 
precedents. 
 
 
 
 53 These regressions include circuit-year-month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
judge. 
 54 Ash, Chen & Lu, supra note 45. 
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Figure 7A: Precedent Partisanship 
 
Figure 7B: Precedent Partisanship Percentile 
 
 In Figure 7A, we see a positive coefficient for Judge Kavanaugh, 
but it is noisy; Justice Gorsch is more polarized in his selection of 
precedents. Judge Garland, on the other hand, uses citations and phrases 
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more often associated with Democrat appointees. But in Figure 7B, we 
can see that Kavanaugh is in fact quite polarized in terms of his ranking 
among all judges. He is in the 15th percentile on precedent polarization. 
 In the case of language, it could be that Kavanaugh is polarized in 
a dimension not easily detected along traditional markers of party lines 
or economics. As Stanford Law Professor Bernadette Meyler has 
written, “in cases involving politically controversial issues, 
[Kavanaugh] tends to acknowledge the views of both sides while stating 
something to the effect that these political considerations can’t weigh 
into his decision and he is instead bound by Supreme Court 
precedent.”55 
B.     Citations to the Constitution 
 A major factor underlying ideological citation could be 
Originalism—the legal philosophy that advocates attention to founding-
era documents and their original meanings. To investigate this 
possibility, we looked at citations to the Articles of the U.S. 
Constitution, in particular Articles II and III. These articles are 
interesting because they refer to the powers of the presidency (Article 
II) and the judiciary (Article III). Conservative jurists tend to cite 
Article II as favoring expanded executive power, including a narrow 
reading of civil liberties in criminal law, terrorism, and related contexts. 
Judges tending to cite Article III may favor more power given to the 
judiciary. In both cases, a focus on Article II and Article III (rather than 
Article I, which concerns Congress) may be interpreted as favoring the 
less democratic branches of government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 Bernadette Meyler, Judge Kavanaugh, Dissenter in Chief, STAN. L. SCH. (July 10, 2018), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2018/07/10/judge-kavanaugh-dissenter-in-chief. She continues: “I have 
already seen people posting a passage in which he explains the views of those who support a right 
to abortion as a sign of his evenhandedness. Kavanaugh’s rhetorical strategy should not mask the 
weight of the decisions at which he ultimately arrives, however.” Id. 
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Figure 8A: Citations to Article II 
 
Figure 8B: Citations to Article III 
 
 For this part of the analysis, outcomes are whether a case cites 
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Article II or Article III of the Constitution.56 These results are reported 
in Figures 8A and 8B. Judge Kavanaugh cites both Article II and Article 
III more than the other jurists analyzed. In comparison, Judge Garland 
was less inclined to cite either of the two Articles. According to this 
measure, Kavanaugh has tended to use Originalist reasoning in his 
opinions. 
C. Use of Economic Analysis 
 Another major source of conservative ideology in the judiciary is 
law and economics. In ongoing work, we have shown that economics 
training and economics ideology is an important source of conservative, 
anti-regulatory decision-making in the courts.57 Here, we look at how 
President Trump’s nominee compares on the use of economics language 
in his opinions. 
 We provide two measures of the use of economics language in 
opinions. These measures are constructed using the document vectors 
for cases described in Section V, supra. As described in our working 
paper,58 the cases are represented in a joint vector space with words, 
where, for example, cases related to “economics” would be closer in the 
vector space to the vector for the word “economics.” Here, therefore, we 
use the closeness to the economics vector as a flexible measure of the 
use of economics language and concepts in opinions. The second 
measure is the similarity of case language to Judge Richard Posner, a 
former circuit court judge and leader in economic analysis of law. This 
Posner metric is constructed the same way that the similarity scores to 
Supreme Court Justices were constructed in Section V, supra. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 Regressions include circuit-year-month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
judge. 
 57 See Elliott Ash, Daniel Chen & Suresh Naidu, Ideas Have Consequences: The Impact of 
Law and Economics on American Justice (July 16, 2018), http://elliottash.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/ash-chen-naidu-2018-07-15.pdf. 
 58 Ash & Chen, supra note 48. 
2018]  WHAT KIND OF JUDGE IS KAVANAUGH?  95 
Figure 9A: Similarity to Economics Language 
 
Figure 9B: Similarity to Richard Posner 
 
 Figures 9A and 9B provide regression results for the economics 
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measures.59 Judge Kavanaugh has been writing opinions that reflect 
economics language (Figure 9A). In addition, Kavanaugh is similar to 
Posner relative to his colleagues (Figure 9B). Gorsuch, Bork, and Scalia 
also tend to rank highly on these metrics. 
VI.     SENTIMENT TOWARD GROUPS AND INSTITUTIONS 
 To better understand the differences among these judges, we 
explore the use of sentiment analysis to analyze their written opinions. 
The goal is to measure the use of positive or negative sentiment when 
the judges discuss various topics. 
 As detailed in a working paper,60 we approach this problem using 
document vectors (also using Doc2Vec) for each sentence in each case. 
We then compute the vector similarity of each sentence to a set of 
targets and a set of sentiment words. The targets include liberal, 
congress, federal, labor, and farmer. The sentiment words include 
positive language (warm, favorable, good) and negative language (cold, 
unfavorable, bad). For a case, the sentiment toward a target is the 
covariance between sentence similarity and target similarity by 
sentence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 The regressions include circuit-year-month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by 
judge. 
 60 See Elliott Ash, Daniel Chen & Sergio Galletta, Judicial Sentiments and Social Attitudes: 
Evidence from U.S. Circuit Courts, http://users.nber.org/~dlchen/papers/Judicial_Sentiments_
and_Social_Attitudes.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
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Figure 10A: Sentiment Towards Liberals 
 
Figure 10B: Sentiment Towards Congress 
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Figure 10C: Sentiment Towards Federal Government  
 
Figure 10D: Sentiment Towards Labor Unions 
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Figure 10E: Sentiment Towards Farmers 
 
 The figures are coefficient plots from case-level regressions, where 
the outcome is sentiment toward the named target.61 In Figure 10A, we 
see that Kavanaugh expresses negative sentiment towards liberals. This 
provides some additional evidence from language content about the 
ideological preferences indicated in the previous results. 
 In Figures 10B and 10C, we see that Judge Kavanaugh expresses 
negative sentiment towards Congress and the Federal Government. 
These “anti-government” attitudes are consonant with ideas about the 
dangers of regulation and a large welfare state. 
 Finally, Figures 10D and 10E show that Judge Kavanaugh 
expresses negative sentiment towards labor unions and farmers. This 
could reveal some negative views for the working class. 
 An important caveat with these sentiment metrics is that they are 
something of a black box, and can be driven by many implicit 
associations in language. They also seem to be quite noisy, as, for 
example, Justices Scalia and Thomas tend to be on wildly different 
sides of the sentiment coin for some of the targets. The more 
experimental language metrics, such as these sentiment associations, 
should be interpreted and used with caution. 
 
 61 The coefficient is on a dummy variable for the Circuit Court judge indicated on the 
horizontal axis. Regressions include circuit-topic-year fixed effects and standard errors clustered 
by judge. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In sum, Kavanaugh is not your average judge. Compared to his 
circuit court colleagues, and to other recent Supreme Court Justices, 
Kavanaugh is an outlier on a range of margins. The Trump 
Administration, the U.S. Senate, and the American people should 
reckon with these facts and figures in the coming weeks. 
 This analysis is useful not just for the confirmation decision on 
Judge Kavanaugh, but also for thinking ahead to future judicial 
nominations. This approach could be used for future Supreme Court 
nominations of Circuit Court judges, and similar comparisons could be 
made for other judgeships. We hope that adding more quantitative 
evidence into judicial nominations could result in a more meritocratic 
judicial selection process and a better-functioning judiciary. 
